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HIS Article summarizes developments in Texas commercial law dur-
ing the 1988 Survey period.' Because 1988 was not a legislative year,
this Article primarily analyzes Texas case law rather than statutory
matters, although a few statutory references appear because of possible fu-
ture legislative action. Some federal cases involving the application of Texas
law have also been included. For ease of reference, this Article follows the
organization of the Uniform Commercial Code adopted in Texas as the
Texas Business and Commerce Code.2
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Acceleration and Foreclosure
Waiver of Notices. The Texas law surrounding the proper method of accel-
erating a debt in preparation for foreclosure remains settled. The general
requirements can be briefly summarized: Proper acceleration requires a no-
tice of intent to accelerate the balance of the debt; this notice is to be fol-
lowed by notice of the acceleration.3 The right to receive either or both of
these notices, however, may be waived by appropriate language in the note
and accompanying security agreement or deed of trust.4
These propositions were reaffirmed in Stricklin v. Levine I where the court
held that the language of a note and a deed of trust, read together as part of
* B.A., J.D., University of Iowa, LL.M., Harvard University, Professor of Law and
Foundation Fellow of Commercial Law, Texas Tech University.
1. The comparable South Western Reporter coverage during this period was from ap-
proximately volume 736 through volume 756.
2. As adopted in Texas, the Uniform Commercial Code appears as TEX. Bus. & CoM.
CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter referred to
as the Code]. The chapters in the Code are organized as follows: Chapter 1, General Provi-
sions; Chapter 2, Sales; Chapter 3, Commercial Paper; Chapter 4, Bank Deposits and Collec-
tions; Chapter 5, Letters of Credit; Chapter 6, Bulk Sales; Chapter 7, Documents of Title;
Chapter 8, Investment Securities; and Chapter 9, Secured Transactions.
3. See, e.g., Williamson v. Dunlap, 693 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1985) (no right to accelerate
when no notice of intent to accelerate was given); Baldazo v. Villa Oldsmobile, 695 S.W.2d 815
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ) (both a notice of intent to accelerate and a notice of
acceleration are required for proper acceleration and foreclosure).
4. See, e.g., Ogden v. Gibraltar Say. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tex. 1982) (notices
required but may be waived in note); Cruce v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 696 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (contractual waiver of notice requirements is valid); Real
Estate Exch., Inc. v. Bacchi, 676 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no
writ) (right to notice of acceleration waived).
5. 750 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ dism'd).
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the same transaction, contained an effective waiver of the right to receive the
required notices. The most interesting part of the Stricklin decision is the
language relied upon by the court to find that the debtor "expressly agreed
to waive notice of intent to accelerate. '' 6 The relevant language quoted from
the note provided, "Every principal, surety, guarantor and endorser of this
note hereby severally waives demand, presentment for payment, notice of
nonpayment, protest and notice of protest."' 7 The language quoted from the
deed of trust provided, "the said note, together with accrued interest
thereon, and all other sums secured hereby, shall, at the option of Benefici-
ary, become at once due and payable without demand or notice, which are
hereby expressly waived... .,, This language should give a cautious creditor
some pause. A better drafting technique would be the addition of a direct
statement that the debtor waives the rights to notice of intent to accelerate
and notice of acceleration. Such a statement would leave no doubt about the
rights that are being waived. 9
II. SALES TRANSACTIONS
A. Enforceability of Sales Contracts
Statute of Frauds. Under section 2.201 of the Code,' 0 a contract for the
sale of goods for a price of five hundred dollars or more must either be evi-
denced by a properly signed writing or must be within one of the exceptions
to the requirement of a signed writing. Between merchants, a written con-
6. Id. at 815.
7. Id. (emphasis by court).
8. Id. (emphasis by court).
9. This suggestion of a more direct waiver statement is prompted by the decision of the
Texas Supreme Court in Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987). In
Melody the court created a new warranty of good and workmanlike repair or modification of
tangible personal property and further held that the new warranty could not be waived or
disclaimed. Id. at 354-55. In the process of reaching that decision, the court also overruled its
earlier decision in G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982). Melody, 741
S.W.2d at 355. G-W-L had posited that warranties of habitability and good workmanship in
the construction of a residence could be disclaimed by language that was "clear and free from
doubt." G-W-L, 643 S.W.2d at 393. In Melody the supreme court did not even discuss the
possibility of establishing strict guidelines for the effectiveness of a disclaimer, but, instead,
simply eliminated the ability to disclaim the warranty of good and workmanlike repair. Mel-
ody, 741 S.W.2d at 355.
While Melody is admittedly a decision in a different legal area, the result may indicate a
general policy approach toward contract waivers affecting important rights. Careful drafters
should guard against loose drafting that permits a court to implement a policy by the "back-
door" of holding a clause insufficiently clear to waive a particular right. Without discussing
the correctness or incorrectness of an "anti-waiver" policy, it at least seems appropriate for a
drafter to close any loopholes that exist in the contract language and force a court to clearly
state its position about the effectiveness of a waiver. It is not an idle exercise to compare the
disclaimer of warranty language quoted in the G-W-L decision with the waiver language
quoted in Stricklin. For an incisive policy analysis about the purpose of waivers and the defec-
tive nature of the waiver of acceleration involved in Cruce, see Cruce v. Eureka Life Ins. Co.,
696 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Howell, J., dissenting). As
for the interaction of disparate legal areas, see infra text accompanying note 278 (discussing
Halter v. Allied Merchants Bank, 751 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ)).
10. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
11. The exceptions include: (1) written confirmations between merchants; (2) specially
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firmation of an oral agreement can sometimes serve as a substitute for a
signed writing. In such cases, the Code requires that the confirmation be
effective against the sender and be received by the other party within a rea-
sonable time after the oral agreement was made. 12 If the party receiving the
confirmation has reason to know its contents and does not give written ob-
jection within ten days after receipt, the confirmation will operate to satisfy
the statute of frauds in an action against the recipient. 13
In Cox Engineering, Inc. v. Funston Machine & Supply Co.14 the court
held that invoices from a manufacturer to an equipment broker referencing a
ten percent downpayment on two oil rigs were sufficient confirmations to
satisfy the statute in a suit against the broker.' 5 The requirement of a proper
''signing" was met by the inclusion of the manufacturer's name and address
on the invoice letterhead.1 6 The court noted that it was interpreting the
Code to accomplish the goals of "simplification, clarification, and moderni-
zation of business practices"17 as mandated by section 1.102 of the Code. 18
In another decision 19 involving written confirmations the court decided
that a farmer was not a merchant who fell within the written confirmation
exception where the farmer had purchased cattle feed only twice within thir-
teen years and had never bought or sold the type of cattle feed that was the
subject of the alleged transaction. The court took pains to explain the fac-
tual difference between this case and the decision by the Texas Supreme
Court in Nelson v. Union Equity Co-operative Exchange,20 where a wheat
farmer was held to be a merchant based on his active dealings in the sale of
wheat over a period of years. While the court was probably correct in its
determination that Nelson was factually distinguishable on the "farmer as
merchant" issue, the case is mystifying on another point. In the course of its
opinion, the court specifically noted that the cattle feed was delivered to the
farmer. 21 If the feed was delivered and accepted, another statutory excep-
tion would have been applicable to permit enforcement of the contract. 22
While it is possible that the feed was not accepted by the farmer upon deliv-
ery, the court mentions neither rejection nor refusal to take delivery and
actually leaves an implication to the contrary. 23
manufactured goods; (3) admissions in pleadings, testimony or otherwise in court; (4) part
payment; and (5) goods received and accepted. Id. § 2.201(b), (c).
12. Id. § 2.201(b).
13. Id.
14. 749 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
15. Id. at 510-11.
16. Under the Code, a writing can be "signed by" any symbol executed or adopted by a
party with present intention to authenticate a writing." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 1.201(39) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
17. 749 S.W.2d at 511.
18. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102(b)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
19. Chisolm v. Cleveland, 741 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ denied).
20. 548 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977).
21. 741 S.W.2d at 620.
22. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(c)(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
23. The court described this part of the factual background in the following terms:
Cleveland sought to enforce an oral contract with Chisolm, a dairy farmer,
for the purchase of one and one-half bags of green chop, which is a feed crop, for
1989]
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In a third case24 involving a written confirmation the court held that a
writing sent from a seller to a buyer that required the buyer to sign and
return the form could not operate as a confirmation, but only as an offer to
be accepted by the act of signing the form. 25 In a significant further ruling,
however, the court held that prior Texas decisions had allowed promissory
estoppel to serve as the basis for enforcing an oral contract if the party seek-
ing the protection of the statute of frauds had orally promised to provide a
written contract satisfying the statute and had subsequently failed to furnish
such a writing.26 The court found the evidence sufficient to show that the
buyer had agreed to buy the goods in question and had promised to sign a
written contract for the purchase.27 Because the court based recovery on
promissory estoppel rather than on breach of contract, the court further held
that the proper measure of damages to the seller was recovery for damages
caused by reliance on the buyer's representation rather than expectation
damages based on profits lost from the failure to perform the contract. 28 In
what may become a significant part of the damage holding, the court also
allowed the recovery of attorney's fees even though the theory of recovery
was based on promissory estoppel instead of breach of contract. 29 The court
noted that no prior decisions had addressed the issue of attorney's fee recov-
ery in promissory estoppel cases. 30
In a fourth case 31 a bank agreed to purchase printing equipment from a
manufacturer and lease the equipment under a lease-purchase plan to a
printing company. While the transaction was described in a signed writing
executed by the bank as lessor and the printing company as lessee, there was
no written contract between the bank and the manufacturer for the purchase
of the equipment. After the manufacturer delivered the equipment to the
lessee, a dispute arose between those parties about the quality of the equip-
ment, and the bank refused to pay for the equipment. The court held that
the uncontradicted testimony of the manufacturer that the bank had prom-
the price of $6,000.00 per bag. Chisolm wanted to purchase by weight, while
Cleveland wanted to sell by volume (per bag). After the sale, Cleveland sent
Chisolm a written confirmation of the contract, to which Chisolm did not re-
spond within ten days. The terms stated by Cleveland called for price by vol-
ume. When the feed was delivered, Chisolm testified he understood the truck
driver to say Cleveland had agreed to Chisolm's terms of sale by weight. Such
was not the case and when Chisolm balked at paying per volume, this suit
resulted.
741 S.W.2d at 620. There is no indication in the opinion of when Chisolm "balked" and what
happened to the feed thereafter, a curious omission.
24. Adams v. Petrade Int'l, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988,
no writ).
25. Id. at 706-07. The court relied on the earlier decision of Great W. Sugar Co. v. Lone
Star Donut Co., 721 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1983) in reaching this result.
26. 754 S.W.2d at 706. This is the first Texas decision extending the promissory estoppel
exception to the article 2 statute of frauds.
27. Id. at 708.
28. Id. at 709.
29. Id. at 720.
30. Id.
31. Texas Am. Bank/Richardson v. A.B. Dick Prods. Co., 747 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1988, writ denied).
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ised to pay for the equipment conclusively established the manufacturer's
right to recover the price of the equipment from the bank. 32
B. Warranties
Restriction of the Parol Evidence Merger Doctrine. Driven in part by the
inclusion of breach of warranty as a separate violation of the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), 33 several warranty cases were reported
during the Survey period. Perhaps the most important of these was the deci-
sion in Alvarado v. Bolton.34 In Alvarado the Texas Supreme Court held that
the parol evidence "doctrine of merger may not be applied to defeat a cause
of action under the DTPA for breach of an express warranty made in an
earnest money contract and breached by deed."' 35 As in the case of Melody
Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes,36 this decision has the potential to cause
immense change in existing Texas law.37 While some earlier decisions38 had
32. Id. at 414. The bank could not raise the statute of frauds as a defense because the
manufacturer brought the action on an account. Id. at 413. The delivery of the equipment to
the lessee, the receipt by the bank of an invoice from the manufacturer, and the signed lease
between the lessee and the bank with an accompanying purchase order signed by the lessee and
running to the manufacturer prevented the bank from claiming the statute's protection. Id. at
414. All of this evidence probably led to the bank's inability to contradict the testimony of the
manufacturer and would amount to an admission in court that a contract for the sale of the
equipment had occurred. The case is interesting as an example of a "finance lease" under a
proposed addition to the Code of a new article 2A governing lease transactions as promulgated
by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. These two bodies were the source of the Official Text of the Uniform Commercial
Code adopted in Texas. The case illustrates the interlocking nature of the existing article 2 on
Sales and the proposed article 2A on leases in transactions where a financial institution is
involved as the financing lessor. Article 2A also includes provisions incorporating several as-
pects of article 9 on secured transactions concerning the rights of lessors and lessees under the
lease and the relationship of those rights vis-A-vis third parties. Article 2A may well be intro-
duced in the 1989 session of the Texas Legislature for possible adoption and is currently under
study by the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the State Bar of Texas to determine the
impact of the article on existing Texas law. Article 2A would probably not change the result
of this case.
One of the most significant issues underlying the increased use of leases was illustrated dur-
ing the Survey period by Potomac Leasing Co. v. Housing Auth., 743 S.W.2d 712 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied). In Potomac a lessee refused to continue making payments
under a lease because of alleged defects in the leased equipment and asserted, inter alia, a claim
for usury against the lessor. The court held that a true lease that is not intended as a disguised
lending transaction is not usurious under Texas law. Id. at 713. Because the lessee had not
claimed that the lease was really a disguised loan, the court determined that there was no
usury violation and reversed a summary judgment in favor of the lessee on this issue. Id. at
713-14. Debate surrounding the possible adoption of article 2A will almost certainly include
discussion about the economic function of leases and whether lease transactions should remain
free of usury regulation.
33. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987). Section 17.50(a)(2) pro-
vides that breach of warranty constitutes a distinct violation.
34. 749 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1988).
35. Id. at 48.
36. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
37. Melody had two holdings that may affect future Texas law. First, the supreme court
held that any contract for the repair or modification of tangible property includes an implied
warranty that the repair or modification would be done in a good and workmanlike manner, in
actions brought under the DTPA. Id. at 354. Second, the court held that this warranty can-
not be waived or disclaimed. Id. at 355. The court reaffirmed the first of these holdings during
the last year in Archibald v. Act III Arabians, 755 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1988), by determining that
1989]
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permitted the introduction of parol evidence in actions based on a misrepre-
sentation under the DTPA "laundry list,' 39 breach of warranty claims were
distinguished because the statutory violations were regarded as being akin to
the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule.4° The Alvarado court chose
not to apply this distinction and held the parol evidence admissible in the
warranty action without an accompanying allegation of misrepresentation
under the DTPA. 4 1
The difficult question Alvarado raises is how far the rationale of the deci-
sion will extend. If the case is narrowly limited to its facts, the rule will be
applied only in real estate transactions when a deed fails to include an ex-
press warranty appearing in an earlier land purchase contract. Such a limi-
tation appears highly artificial, however, since the merger doctrine may
provide more benefits in the real property area, which requires clear rules
establishing titles to land. The more significant erosion of the parol evidence
rule and the merger doctrine has taken place in the law of contracts, 42 but
the parol evidence rule certainly still exists.4 3
Abolition of the parol evidence rule in the area where it had been the most
settled while leaving the rule in place in the area where it has been the most
criticized would be curious jurisprudence indeed. The extension of Alvarado
the service of training horses is within the scope of the implied warranty created by Melody.
Id. at 86. It is important to note that the court in Archibald based its holding on the theory
that horse training is a form of modification of goods (i.e., behavior modification) and did not
base the holding on the theory that there is a warranty governing professional services. Id.
Cases such as Brooks, Tarlton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d
1378 (5th Cir. 1988), holding that there is no implied warranty that professional services will
be performed in a good and workmanlike manner, remain proper interpretations of Melody
following the decision in Archibald. During the Survey period the court in Walker v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1988), expanded Melody by holding that the
implied warranty created by Melody was not limited to actions brought under the DTPA, but
could be used as the basis of an ordinary breach of warranty claim. As such, the claim was
cognizable under the longer four-year statute of limitations for contract actions instead of
being barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in the DTPA. Id. at 363 (citing
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.565, 17.43 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1988)). This
possible expansion of Melody as well as other potential ramifications are discussed in greater
detail in Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 217,
222-25 (1988).
38. See, e.g., Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985); Anthony Indus., Inc. v.
Ragsdale, 643 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. The DTPA contains a list of twenty-three deceptive acts or practices that can support
a laundry list claim. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon 19987).
40. In fact, the first opinion issued by the supreme court in Alvarado adopted this ration-
ale. See Alvarado v. Bolton, 1987 WL 1816 (Tex. 1987). This opinion was denominated as
"unpublished," and a second opinion was eventually substituted and released for publication.
The second opinion appears at 749 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1988). The court followed a similar se-
quence in deciding Melody. See Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 489
(June 17, 1987) (unpublished), withdrawn and replaced by Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes,
741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
41. 749 S.W.2d at 48.
42. The movement from a strict, if not wooden, application of the parol evidence rule to a
less rigid application has been traced in several treatises on contract law. See, e.g., A. FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS 447-61 (1982); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts 103-11 (2d ed. 1977)
and 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 573-595 (1963).
43. The Code itself contains a statutory expression of the parol evidence rule. See TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.202 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
[Vol. 43
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
to express warranties on personal property under the DTPA appears
likely.44 Extension to warranty actions brought outside the DTPA, such as
actions brought under the Code, is more problematic. The court emphasized
the legislative purpose of the DTPA in reaching its decision in Alvarado,
possibly indicating that extension beyond the DTPA will not occur.45 The
parol evidence rule contained in the Code 46 also imposes a barrier to ex-
tending Alvarado to cases arising under the Code, although this would not be
so for common law contract matters, such as contracts for services, lease
agreements, or real property transactions. 47
Implied Warranty of Suitability in Commercial Leases. In Davidow v. In-
wood North Professional Group-Phase 148 the Texas Supreme Court reviewed
the reasons for imposing a warranty of habitability in residential leases49 and
concluded that many of these reasons were equally valid as arguments for
extending a similar warranty to commercial leases. 50 The court therefore
held that an implied warranty of suitability exists in commercial leases to
ensure that the premises are suitable and can be used for "their intended
commercial purpose." 5' A breach of this warranty by the landlord may per-
mit the tenant to discontinue rent payments and, in an extreme situation, to
justify the abandonment of the premises by the tenant.5 2 Although the court
44. Since the court has already held in Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985) that
the parol evidence rule will not prevent the admissibility of evidence of oral misrepresentations
in DTPA actions, the exclusion of written misrepresentations would make no sense in such
actions. The argument can still be made, however, that even an express written warranty on
personal property should be capable of being superseded by a subsequent integrated agreement
that expresses the entire understanding of the parties. To put the argument another way, a
representation is not necessarily a misrepresentation.
45. In the course of its opinion, the court stated:
In 1980 we stated that "[t]he DTPA does not represent a codification of the
common law" and a primary purpose of the Act was to provide consumers a
cause of action for deceptive trade practices without the numerous defenses en-
countered in a common law fraud or breach of warranty suit.
Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988) (citing Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611,
616 (Tex. 1980)).
46. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.202 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
47. For a further discussion of how DTPA decisions can grow beyond the scope of that
statute, see supra note 36.
48. 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988).
49. In Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978), the supreme court adopted a
rule creating an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases. The court discussed the
policies underlying this decision at some length in the course of the Davidow opinion.
Kamarath, 568 S.W.2d at 661.
50. 747 S.W.2d at 376-77.
51. Id. at 377. The court further elucidated the scope of this warranty in the following
terms:
This warranty means that at the inception of the lease there are no latent defects
in the facilities that are vital to the use of the premises for their intended com-
mercial purpose and that these essential facilities will remain in a suitable condi-
tion. If, however, the parties to a lease expressly agree that the tenant will repair
certain defects, then the provisions of the lease will control.
Id.
52. The court pointedly noted that whether a breach of the warranty of suitability occurs
is
usually a fact question to be determined from the particular circumstances of
1989]
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denied an award of damages in favor of the tenant because of failure to plead
an affirmative cause of action, 53 such damages appear recoverable in a
proper case. Moreover, the action would be cognizable under the DTPA as
a breach of warranty claim.
Warranty: Negligence or Contract? One of the principal effects of interac-
tion between the Code, the DTPA, and recent court decisions54 has been a
continued blurring of the lines between claims for breach of warranty, negli-
gence, and contract."5 Another example of this interaction was reported in
FDP Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.56 In FDP a yellow pages cus-
tomer sued to recover for breach of contract, for negligent performance of
contract, and for breach of express warranty under the DTPA when a tele-
phone company failed to include an advertisement for the customer's busi-
ness.57 The court rejected the telephone company's argument that this was
only a breach of contract action and that a limitation of liability clause pre-
vented recovery for damages in excess of the price of the advertisement. 58
The court instead held that the case could be maintained either as a negli-
gence claim or as a DTPA claim for breach of express warranty. 59 The
each case. Among the factors to be considered when determining whether there
has been a breach of this warranty are: the nature of the defect; its effect on the
tenant's use of the premises; the length of time the defect persisted; the age of
the structure; the amount of the rent; the area in which the premises are located;
whether the tenant waived the defects; and whether the defect resulted from any
unusual or abnormal use by the tenant.
Id.
In Davidow the materiality of the breach was clear. The premises had been rented for use as
medical office space by Dr. Davidow. During the course of the lease, the air conditioning often
failed; the roof leaked whenever it rained, causing stained tiles, mildew and rot; patients had to
avoid the leaks when sitting in the waiting room; pests and rodents infested the office; the
hallways were dark because lights were not replaced; the parking lot was filled with trash; hot
water was not provided; the electricity was once shut down because of the landlord's failure to
pay the electric bill; and there were several burglaries and acts of vandalism. The doctor
moved out about fourteen months before the end of the five-year lease term.
53. 747 S.W.2d at 377.
54. For representative decisions showing this interaction, see Melody Home Mfg. Co. v.
Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987) (contracts to repair or modify tangible goods or property
include a warranty to make the repairs or modifications in a good and workmanlike manner;
quality of repair measured by standards applied to persons skilled in the particular trade or
occupation, not by a guarantee of results; concurrence argued creation of new warranty was
unnecessary since case could be pursued in contract or for negligent performance of contract);
Rocha v. Merritt, 734 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) (negligent
performance of services could be "characterized as a claim in contract and/or tort"); Ruben
H. Donnelly Corp. v. McKinnon, 688 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (failure to publish advertising in telephone directory actionable as negligent per-
formance of contract); Farina v. Southwestern Bell Media, 658 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Tex. 1987)
(negligent performance of contract is tort claim; no liability for failure to publish advertising in
telephone directory).
55. This subject is discussed at greater length in Krahmer, supra note 27, at 222-25.
56. 749 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
57. Adding insult to injury, although the ad did not appear in the directory, the telephone
company billed the customer for the ad and threatened to terminate phone service if the bill
was not paid. The customer paid the charges for several months, although the telephone com-
pany eventually credited the customer's account for the erroneous charges.
58. Id. at 570.
59. The language used by the court in summarizing its characterization of the cause of
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court deemed the limitation of liability clause ineffective because of section
17.42 of the DTPA.6° The court determined that sufficient evidence existed
for a jury to find both a breach of warranty and damage and remanded the
case for a new trial.61
In Dallas Power & Light v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.62 the buyer as-
serted claims for negligence, breach of express and implied warranties aris-
ing in the sales transaction, and breach of an implied warranty of good and
workmanlike repair. The court held that the running of the statute of limita-
tions barred the negligence claims because the injury occurred more than
two years before the action was brought. 63 The claims based on breach of
warranties in the sales transaction were also deemed barred by operation of a
one-year limitation of the seller's liability contained in the sales contract, and
none of the warranties extended to the future performance of the goods so as
to avoid the one-year limitation." The buyer also argued that the seller had
breached the Melody65 implied warranty of good and workmanlike repair.
The court rejected this argument and distinguished Melody on the ground
that the seller had never attempted to make repairs and had no contractual
duty to do so. 66 The seller could not be liable, therefore, for failure to make
repairs in a good and workmanlike manner when it had never tried to make
any repairs. 67
Burdens of Proof in Warranty or DTPA Representation of Quality Ac-
tions. Several cases decided during the Survey period dealt with the alloca-
tion of burdens of proof in warranty actions. 68 In Kirby Forest Industries,
Inc. v. Dobbs69 the court held that a buyer of timber seeking to recover
under an express warranty of good title has the burden of proving that the
action is instructive: "When, as here, an express warranty is made or a promised service is not
performed in a good and workmanlike manner, a consumer can sue for breach of warranty
under sec. 17.50." Id. This characterization could make any negligent performance of con-
tractual duties into a DTPA warranty claim.
60. Id. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon 1987) provides, in relevant part,
"Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this subchapter is contrary to public policy
and is unenforceable and void." To the extent that a limitation of liability clause would avoid
DTPA liability, the clause is ineffective. See Martin v. Lou Poliquin Enter., 696 S.W.2d 180
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. 749 S.W.2d at 572. In the first trial, the jury found a breach of express warranty, but
had also returned a finding of no damage. The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment
against the customer. On appeal, the court believed the no damage finding was against the
great weight of the evidence.
62. 855 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1988).
63. Id. at 206..
64. Id. at 207-08. Such limitations are expressly permitted by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 2.725(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
65. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987). For additional dis-
cussion of Melody, see supra note 37.
66. 855 F.2d at 208.
67. Id.
68. See Kennemore v. Bennett, 755 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. 1988); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fiberex,
Inc., 751 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ granted); Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc.
v. Donwerth, 744 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. App.-Dallas 198, writ granted); Kirby Forest Indus.,
Inc. v. Dobbs, 743 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ denied).
69. 743 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ denied).
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warranty was part of the basis of the bargain between the parties. 70 Because
no evidence was introduced on this point, the buyer could not recover on a
theory of express warranty. 7' On a parallel claim for breach of an implied
warranty, however, the court held that the seller had the burden of proving
that the implied warranty of good title had been excluded when the contract
was made.7 2 The seller provided no pleading or proof on this issue, which
entitled the buyer to judgment on the implied warranty theory.73
In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fiberex, Inc. 74 the buyer sued under both the Code
and the DTPA for breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose.7 5 The buyer had purchased quantities of
polyester resin to laminate fiberglass swimming pools. The resin failed to
bond and the buyer argued that this sufficiently showed that the resin was
not fit for its ordinary purpose. The buyer obtained a jury verdict in the trial
court and the seller appealed, arguing that there was no evidence to prove
that the resin was defective at the time it left the manufacturer. 76 The court
held that, while the buyer did not have to directly prove that the resin had a
defect, the buyer needed to prove more than a simple failure to bond. 7 7 The
buyer had to show, at least circumstantially, that the resin failed to bond
because of some act of the manufacturer before it left the manufacturer's
possession and that the failure was not due to misapplication by the buyer or
because of some other factor that affected the resin. 78 On this issue of proof
of defect, the court distinguished the earlier decision in Bernard v. Dresser
Industries, Inc.,79 which held that proof of a defect was not required in a
70. Id. at 355. Under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.107(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968), a contract for the sale of timber is covered by the provisions of chapter 2 of the Code
even though it is part of the realty at the time of contracting. The court was probably incor-
rect in the allocation of this burden of proof since TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.313(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) contemplates that affirmations of fact or promises
made by a seller become part of the description of the goods. Official comment 3 to
§ 2.313(a)(1) provides, inter alia,
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during
a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no partic-
ular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them into the
fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirmations, once
made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof.
Id. comment 3 (emphasis added).
71. 743 S.W.2d at 355.
72. Id. Under the Code, an implied warranty of good title is said to be "excluded" rather
than "disclaimed" to make it clear that the transfer of good title is a normally expected inci-
dent of a sale and that specific language must be used if the seller does not intend to transfer
good title. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); Id. com-
ment 6.
73. Kirby, 743 S.W.2d at 355.
74. 751 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ granted).
75. The warranty of merchantability is implied in the sale of goods by TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) and the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose is implied by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The
claim for breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was apparently dropped
from the case prior to appeal.
76. 751 S.W.2d at 630.
77. Id. at 633.
78. Id. at 633-34.
79. 691 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
[Vol. 43
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
breach of warranty action.80 The court noted that Dresser concerned the
failure of a mechanical product under circumstances where no other expla-
nation was possible and that the failure of the resin to bond could have re-
sulted from a number of reasons other than a defect.81
The U.S. Steel court further held that the buyer had the burden of proving
a causal connection between defects in the resin and the damages suffered by
the buyer.82 On this issue, the buyer faced substantial difficulties since it had
manufactured a large number of pools during the time period in question
and had kept no records about which pools were manufactured with the
allegedly defective resin. Beyond this significant problem, the evidence at
trial revealed that at least twelve different reasons could have accounted for
the bonding failure and that only two of those were directly related to the
manufacture of the resin. The court concluded that the jury finding was
against the weight of the evidence on this issue.83
The seller also contended that a disclaimer printed on invoices sent to the
buyer effectively avoided liability for breach of implied warranty and that
the DTPA notice letter sent by the buyer was inadequate.8 4 The court ruled
against the seller on both of these issues.85
The Texas Supreme Court in Kennemore v. Bennett 8 6 held that the buyers
of a new home had the burden of proving that the contractor "failed to
construct the home in a manner generally considered proficient by those ca-
pable of judging such work"87 to prove breach of an implied warranty that
the home would be constructed in a good and workmanlike manner.88 In
80. Id. at 738.
81. US. Steel, 751 S.W.2d at 632-33.
82. Id. at 634-35.
83. Id. at 637.
84. Id. at 637-38.
85. Id. at 638. The issue of proper notice of a DTPA claim also arose in Cielo Dorado
Dev., Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 744 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1988). In Cielo the only evidence show-
ing that notice was given was a brief conclusory statement by the attorney for the plaintiff
buyer. No issue on notice was requested or submitted, and the defendant seller did not object
to the failure to request an issue. The court rendered judgment for the buyer. On appeal the
supreme court held that the issue of notice was to be deemed found in support of the judgment
under TEX. R. Civ. P. 279. 744 S.W.2d at 11. The most interesting part of the opinion,
however, is the suggestion by the court that proof of proper notice may not be a part of the
plaintiff's burden in DTPA cases. The suggestion occurs twice in the course of the opinion. In
the first reference, the court stated: "Even if we assume arguendo that notice under [TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A (Vernon 1987)] was an element of Cielo Dorado's case,
Cielo Dorado's attorney testified without objection that notice was given pursuant to the
DTPA." 744 S.W.2d at 11. In the second reference, the court stated: "The testimony by
Cielo Dorado's attorney was conclusory, but it came in without objection. We hold that con-
stituted some evidence of proper notice under the DTPA. Again, assuming proper notice was
Cielo Dorado's issue, Certainteed was required to object to its non-submission." Id. (emphasis
in original). A dissenting opinion argued that: "Under the 1979 amendment to the Act, there
is no question that this burden rests solely on the plaintiff once the issue of notice is joined.
The majority's apparent attempt to open this question by the use of the word 'assuming' is not
supportable under the facts of this case or prior case law." Id. at 11-12. (Gonzalez, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
86. 755 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. 1988).




reaching this decision, the court rejected a defense argument that the buyers
had waived the right to maintain the action as a DTPA claim by taking
possession of the home and paying the contractor for additional work on the
home.8 9 The court reasoned that in a DTPA claim traditional contract the-
ories were not applicable to bar the action by the buyers. 90 The court also
noted that proof of specific defects not only provided evidence of breach of
warranty, but also provided some evidence of a misrepresentation of the
standard, quality, or grade of the home.9'
Preston H Chrysler-Dodge v. Donwerth 92 was a DTPA claim brought for
an alleged misrepresentation rather than for breach of warranty.93 When
the car was purchased, one of the buyers commented to the salesman: "that
there 'was something wrong with the brakes.' -94 "The salesman responded
that he had used this car as his 'personal car,' that this was a 'good car' and
that there 'wasn't anything wrong with the brakes.' "95 The brakes required
a complete overhaul six months later, after the car had been driven some
3200 miles.96 The buyers also asserted a misrepresentation of the mileage
based on an incorrect odometer reading.97 The court held there was no evi-
dence to support the jury finding that the salesman had misrepresented the
standard, quality, or grade of the brakes. 98 As to the mileage claim, the
court noted that the only mileage representation made by the seller was that
the odometer reading was the actual mileage on the car as far as the seller
knew. 99 Without evidence showing actual knowledge of falsity on the
seller's part, the court held that a DTPA claim would not lie for this repre-
sentation. °0 Finding no evidence to support the buyers' claims, the court
89. Id.
90. Id. at 90-91. The ability of a buyer to avoid traditional contract defenses in actions
maintained under the DTPA-has been noted in several decisions. See, e.g., Weitzel v. Barnes,
691 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985); Martin v. Lou Poliquin Enter., 696 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Reliance Universal, Inc. v. Sparks Indus. Servs.,
Inc., 688 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
91. 755 S.W.2d at 92. The misrepresentation of standard, quality, or grade constitutes a
separate cause of action under the DTPA. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(7)
(Vernon 1987).
92. 744 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ granted).
93. The claim was most likely brought on this single ground instead of following the more
common practice of including a warranty claim as well because the Texas case law in the lower
appellate courts has developed in the direction of denying the existence of implied warranties
in the sale of used goods. See, e.g., Southerland v. Northeast Datsun, 659 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1983, no writ); Bunting v. Fodor, 586 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1979, no writ); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ). There is no indication of why an express warranty
claim was not joined with the DTPA claim.




98. Id. The misrepresentation of standard, quality, or grade is made actionable by TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(7) (Vernon 1987).
99. 744 S.W.2d at 144.
100. Id. at 145. In Pfeiffer v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate, 747 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1988, no writ), another case decided during the Survey period, the court reached a
similar result in a DTPA action brought under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§
17.46(b)(23), .50(a)(3) (Vernon 1987). According to the court: "one does not commit a decep-
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ruled that the trial court had erred in disregarding jury findings that the
claims had been brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment and
that the seller was entitled to recover attorney's fees of $7,000.00.101 The
court reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment in
favor of the seller for recovery of the attorney's fees found by the jury. 102
C. Unconscionability
Both the Code and the DTPA contain provisions dealing with unconscio-
nability.10 3 The Code rules, however, allow the use of unconscionability
only as a defense to enforcement of a contract while the DTPA allows un-
conscionability to be used as the basis of a claim for damages.104 Little in-
centive exists, therefore, to use the Code instead of the DTPA when the
unconscionability of a contract is in issue.
The DTPA contains two alternative definitions for an unconscionable ac-
tion or course of action. 105 The first definition covers an act or practice that
"takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of
a person to a grossly unfair degree."' 0 6 The second definition provides that
an act or practice is unconscionable if it "results in a gross disparity between
the value received and consideration paid, in a transaction involving transfer
of consideration."10
7
In Brown v. Galleria Area Ford ' 0 8 the Texas Supreme Court found the
evidence sufficient under either definition to support a judgment for the ad-
versely affected consumer.'°9 The consumers were not told that a car dealer-
ship had significantly changed ownership and management operations
between the time when the consumers brought their truck in for repairs and
the time when the repairs were finally completed, albeit ineffectively, several
weeks later. Under an internal agreement between the prior owner and the
tive trade practice if he fails to disclose material facts of which he has no knowledge to the
buyer. There is a distinction between misrepresentations and a failure to disclose information.
One cannot be held liable under the Act for failure to disclose facts about which he does not
know." 747 S.W.2d at 889-90 (citation omitted).
The case concerned problems with the settling of a house foundation. The jury had reached
a verdict in favor of the buyers based on evidence of previous foundation repairs and repairs
made inside the house, evidence of common knowledge among real estate companies in the
area that the house had a history of foundation problems and a refusal by other companies to
list the house, evidence that the listing agent was a friend of the previous owner and had visited
in the house, and an inspection report prepared before the sale that reported "some foundation
settling." Id. at 890. The trial court rendered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor
of the real estate company and this judgment was upheld on appeal on the ground that this
evidence did not show actual knowledge of the defects on the part of the company. Id.
101. 744 S.W.2d at 145.
102. Id. at 146.
103. The principal Code provision on unconscionability appears in TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 2.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The DTPA provision is contained in TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon 1987).
104. See id.
105. Id. §§ 17.45(5)(A) & (B).
106. Id. § 17.45(5)(A).
107. Id. § 17.45(5)(B).
108. 752 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1988).
109. Id. at 116.
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new owner, all DTPA claims were to be the responsibility of the prior
owner, but the new owner had the responsibility for the actual operation of
the dealership. When the truck was delivered to the consumers as "re-
paired," the brakes were found to be dangerously defective and the frame so
damaged in the course of the repair work that it could not be fixed.10 The
change in ownership during the course of repairs surfaced as an attempt by
each company to place the responsibility on the other for the defective re-
pairs, and the consumers were unable to discern with whom they should be
dealing. The court found the evidence sufficient to support a jury finding
that the consumers had been grossly taken advantage of and that gross dis-
parity existed between the value of the repairs received and the consideration
paid. "'
In Sun Power v. Adams 12 a buyer purchased a cash register and printer
that the seller represented to be IBM compatible when in fact they were not.
The seller also said that he would fully service the machines and if there
were any problems that could not be corrected, the buyer could return the
equipment for a full refund of the purchase price. After the machines were
installed, the buyer endured three months of frustration caused by improper
calculation of receipts and cash by the cash register, repeated printer break-
downs, and literally hundreds of extra hours of lost time spent reconciling
accounting records by hand and attempting to reprogram the cash register.
During this time, the seller worked on the equipment without noticeable
success, but he finally told the buyer that any further repairs were no longer
his problem and refused to refund the purchase price or pick up the
machines.
Although the jury had found the seller's conduct to be unconscionable
and awarded damages to the buyer, the trial court rendered judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the seller. 113 On appeal, the court
found the evidence sufficient to support the jury finding on either of the two
tests for unconscionability and reinstated the jury verdict. 114
In Wyatt v. Petrila 15 the court considered whether a disparity of fifty
thousand dollars between the $625,000.00 consideration paid for a house
and the $575,000.00 value that was found to have been received was a "gross
disparity" within the meaning of the unconscionability definition. 16 In the
court's view, prior decisions finding gross disparity involved situations where
the value received was nothing or next to nothing." 7 Here, the purchasers
had received a house of considerable value, although less than they had paid.
The court ruled, as a matter of law, that the purchasers had not shown a
110. Id.
111. Id. at 117.
112. 751 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App,-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
113. Id. at 691-92.
114. Id. at 695.
115. 752 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
116. Id. at 686.




D. Good Faith Purchase
Authority to Sell. In IFG Leasing Co. v. Ellis 119 a buyer purchased a grain
trailer from a company that represented itself as the owner's agent. The
buyer paid the full price to the agent and received the trailer in exchange.
Neither the agent nor the owner ever provided the buyer with a certificate of
title. The agent subsequently filed for bankruptcy and the owner sued the
buyer for return of the trailer contending that the agent had no authority to
sell until the full purchase price was paid over to the owner, which had never
taken place. The buyer counterclaimed under the DTPA for an order com-
pelling the turnover of the certificate of title and for the recovery of attor-
ney's fees. The court held there was adequate evidence to support findings
that the agent had authority to sell the trailer without restriction and that
the buyer qualified as a buyer in the ordinary course of business without
knowledge that the sale was made in violation of the ownership rights of a
third person. 120 The owner also contended that the sale was void under the
Certificate of Title Act 121 because a certificate of title was not transferred
when the sale was made. The court held that a sale made without complying
with the act could be effective between the immediate parties even if it was
ineffective against third parties. 122 The court held that the owner had vio-
lated the DTPA by misrepresenting the authority of the agent, since the
owner had subsequently denied the authority of the agent to close the sale
without restriction in a letter sent to the buyer after the sale had occurred. 123
The court affirmed an order in favor of the buyer requiring the turnover of
the certificate of title and awarding attorney's fees to the buyer for the
DTPA violation. 124
Secured Creditor as Good Faith Purchaser. Under the Code, a secured
creditor can qualify as a good faith purchaser capable of acquiring rights in
personal property superior to those of a prior owner.125 In MBank Waco v.
L & J, Inc. 126 the court held that a bank with a perfected security interest in
118. Id. at 686.
119. 748 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
120. Id. at 566. Although not cited by the court in the course of its opinion, this is one of
the good faith purchase standards contained in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968).
121. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1, §§ 33 & 53 (Vernon 1977).
122. 748 S.W.2d at 566. This is consistent with prior interpretations of the Certificate of
Title Act. See, e.g., Drake Ins. Co. v. King, 606 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1980); Everett v. U.S. Fire
Ins. Co., 653 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ); Pfluger v. Colquitt, 620
S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
123. 748 S.W.2d at 567. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(14) (Vernon 1987)
prohibits "misrepresenting the authority of a salesman, representative or agent to negotiate the
final terms of a consumer transaction."
124. 748 S.W.2d at 568.
125. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.201(32), (33) & 2.403(a), (d) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968). The complex relationship between these sections is carefully discussed at
length in In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
126. 754 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, writ denied).
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after-acquired collateral obtained title to the collateral and its proceeds supe-
rior to that of an owner who had left the property in the hands of the debtor
under circumstances that made it appear the debtor was the owner.1 27
E. Remedies for Breach
Breach of Installment Contract and Recovery of Lost Profits. In USX Corp. v.
Union Pacific Resources Co. 128 the seller and buyer entered into a four-year
installment contract calling for the delivery of between 75 million and 125
million pounds of cumene per year.129 The open price term payments called
for payment according to "the prevailing price in cents per pound, FOB
Gulf Coast."' 130 At about the time for the first delivery under the contract,
the buyer began complaining about the price and did not take delivery of the
first installment as originally planned. Discussions between the parties re-
sulted in some adjustment in the price and a revised agreement on the quan-
tity of the first installment. The buyer subsequently failed to take any
delivery of cumene under the revised agreement and also failed to respond to
the seller's demand for an assurance of due performance. 13 1 Following these
events, the seller cancelled the contract and sued for recovery of lost prof-
its. 132 The court determined that the special issues adequately instructed the
jury with respect to the standards for the recovery of lost profits and that the
buyer had sufficient notice that the seller was seeking recovery on this the-
ory. 133 The buyer contended that the seller did not have adequate grounds
to cancel the contract. On this issue, the court found that the seller was
justified in cancelling because of substantial impairment of the whole con-
tract1a4 as well as the failure of the buyer to provide an adequate assurance
of due performance.135
127. Id. at 251-52. The collateral consisted of cattle left in the possession of the debtor and
marked, with the owner's knowledge and consent, with the debtor's registered brand. The
owner admitted that one could assume the cattle marked with the brand were owned by the
debtor, thereby making it impossible to tell from looking at the cattle that the owner had an
interest in them. Id. at 251. In addition, the owner had nothing on file to indicate an interest
in the cattle. Id.
128. 753 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
129. Id. at 847. Cumene is a chemical compound manufactured by combining benzene and
propylene.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 848. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.609 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) per-
mits a party who has become insecure about the likelihood of the other party's performance to
demand an assurance of due performance. A failure to respond to the demand within a rea-
sonable time not exceeding thirty days constitutes a repudiation of the contract. Id.
132. The recovery of lost profits is one of the remedies available to a seller who loses sale
volume because of the buyer's breach or who stops the manufacture of incomplete goods upon
learning of a breach. Id. § 2.708(b).
133. 753 S.W.2d at 849-50. The same court had previously discussed in detail the special
issue requirements for the recovery of lost profits in Malone v. Carl Kisabeth Co., 726 S.W.2d
188 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Although the special issues in USX did
not precisely track the wording suggested in Kisabeth, they were deemed adequate to bring the
seller within TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.708(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
134. 753 S.W.2d at 851. This is the standard for cancellation in the case of installment
contracts stated in TEX. Bus, & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.612 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
135. 753 S.W.2d at 851. This independent ground for cancellation appears in TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.609 & 2.703 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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Recovery of Amount Paid as Damage. In Vogelsang v. Reece Import Autos 136
the buyer had contracted for the repainting of a car. The buyer was dissatis-
fied with the completed job and sued under the DTPA for recovery of the
price paid for the work. The court determined the evidence sufficient for a
jury to find that the work was worthless and that delivery of a worthless
performance in exchange for a price could constitute adequate proof of dam-
age under the DTPA.137 A take-nothing judgment was reversed and the
case was remanded for trial. 138
F. Miscellaneous
Recovery Under Different Theories for Same Acts Not Allowed. In American
Baler Co. v. SRS Systems, Inc.139 the buyer recovered damages based on
theories of DTPA violations, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach
of contract. The court held that allowing damages separately under the
DTPA, fraud, and misrepresentation theories would amount to double re-
covery for actual damages under different theories for the same acts."40 The
court therefore awarded only the highest amount of damage allowed under a
single theory.' 4 ' Separate damages for breach of contract were not
contested. 142
Recorded Notice No Defense to DTPA Claim. In Ojeda de Toca v. Wise 143
the Texas Supreme Court held that a recorded notice of a demolition order
would not bar an action by the buyer of a house against a real estate com-
pany that knew about the order but sold the house without disclosing its
existence.144 The court ruled that imputed notice by operation of the re-
cording acts will not bar a DTPA claim for failure to disclose material
information. 145
III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Holding in Due Course
Acquisition of Holder in Due Course Status. A holder in due course takes an
instrument free from personal defenses of a party with whom the holder has
not dealt.' 46 Until evidence is introduced showing that a defense exists, a
holder is presumed to be a holder in due course thereby entitling him to
136. 745 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
137. Id. at 49.
138. Id. The opinion does not indicate the theory on which the case was brought, but
breach of warranty, unconscionability, or violation of a laundry list provision all appear possi-
ble given the delivery of a worthless performance. Id.
139. 748 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
140. Id. at 246.
141. Id. The highest amount awarded was under the DTPA.
142. Id.
143. 748 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1988).
144. Id. at 451.
145. Id.
146. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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recover on the instrument.1 47 In Shenandoah Associates v. J & K Properties,
Inc.148 the court found the evidence insufficient to deprive the holder of the
benefit of the presumption. 149 In Jones v. Missouri Savings Association 150 a
statement that a decorator's allowance had been allowed to the purchaser of
condominiums did not constitute notice of a defense to a note so as to de-
prive the holder of holder in due course status.151
In contrast, if the court finds the evidence sufficient to establish a defense,
the holder must show that he or she is qualified in all respects as a holder in
due course. 152 In Bohmfalk v. Linwood 153 the holder of a check allegedly
won the instrument in a crap game, thus failing to satisfy the value require-
ment of holding in due course if the allegation was true. The court held that
it was error to exclude deposition testimony by an officer of the bank on
which the check was drawn to the effect that the holder had admitted win-
ning the check at craps. 154 The court considered the offered testimony both
as an admission against interest within the exception to the hearsay rule and
as an impeachment of the holder's testimony. 15  The court remanded the
case for a new trial.' 56 The court did not note, however, that even if the
holder did not qualify as a holder in due course by taking the check in pay-
ment of a gambling debt, this alone would not constitute a defense to pay-
ment by the drawer since the gambling transaction was between the payee
and the holder and did not involve the drawer. 157 The Code does not permit
the claims of third persons, such as that of the payee in Bohmfalk, to be used
as a defense by a maker or drawer unless the third person himself defends
the action on behalf of the maker or drawer. 158
147. Id. § 3.307(c); see Jonwilco, Inc. v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs., 662 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ) (holder is presumed to be a holder in due course
until a defense is shown to exist); Favors v. Yaffe, 605 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holder need not prove holder in due course status
unless a defense is shown).
148. 741 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied).
149. Id. at 483. The jury found that the holder had no knowledge of and had not partici-
pated in any misrepresentation or other wrongdoing concerning the instrument. Id.
150. 756 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
151. Id. at 425. There was a failure to show that the holder had even seen the documents
in which the statement about the allowance was contained. The court noted that, even without
this failure of proof, "we fail to see how the statement about a decorator's allowance would put
MSA or any other holder on notice that it is part of the down payment." Id.
152. The requirements to qualify as a holder in due course are specified in TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 3.202 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). To be a holder in due course, the
instrument must be taken for value, in good faith and without notice that the instrument is
overdue or that a defense against it exists. Id.
153. 742 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
154. Id. at 521.
155. Id. at 521-22.
156. Id. at 522.
157. Id. at 520.
158. This limitation on the ability of a maker or drawer to raise jus tertii defenses appears
in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.306(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section 3.306(4) the
Code was discussed and correctly applied in Davis v. Watson Bros. Plumbing, 615 S.W.2d 844
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ). The court in Bohmfalk believed that simply proving
that the holder was not a holder in due course would prevent recovery. This reasoning by the
court is an incorrect view of the jus tertii under § 3.306(4) of the Code.
In another gambling case, Ryno v. Tyra, 752 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no
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Another part of qualifying as a holder in due course is that the purchaser
of an instrument must be a "holder."' 59 A purchaser becomes a holder by
proper negotiation. If the instrument is bearer paper, negotiation is by deliv-
ery; if the instrument is order paper, negotiation is by delivery together with
a proper indorsement.16° An indorsement must be written on the instru-
ment or on a paper firmly affixed to the instrument.' 6 ' In Crossland Savings
Bank FSB v. Constant 162 the indorsement was put on a separate piece of
paper and stapled to the instruments. The court held that the writing on the
separate paper did not constitute an effective indorsement to make the trans-
feree a holder and, hence, a holder in due course, for two reasons. The court
reasoned that stapling did not adequately affix the separate paper to the in-
struments and the instruments themselves provided sufficient room for the
indorsement.163 The transferee remained subject to any personal defenses
available to prior parties. 164
B. Liability of Parties
Signatures by Representatives. Under section 3.401 of the Code: "No per-
son is liable on an instrument unless his name appears thereon."'' 65 An
agent may sign an instrument on behalf of a principal and, if the signature
shows that the agent has signed only in a representative capacity, the agent is
not personally liable on the instrument.' 66 What happens if an agent signs
an instrument that shows he or she signed in a representative capacity, but
the instrument does not name the principal for whom the agent is acting?
writ), the loser of a coin flip, a car dealer, turned over the keys, a German document of title,
and a $125,000.00 BMW to the winner. The car was later loaned back to the dealer for a car
show, and the dealer refused to return the car when the show was over and later sold it to a
third party. The aggrieved winner sued the dealer for conversion. The court held that
although the transaction would have been initially void as a gambling transaction, the dealer
had voluntarily and gratuitously parted with the car and indicia of ownership thus making a
completed gift of the vehicle. Id. at 150. As a gift, the car could then be the subject of conver-
sion and a conversion action would properly lie. Id. Perhaps the lesson of these cases for
gamblers is: "Take cars, not checks."
159. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
160. Id. § 3.202(a).
161. Id. § 3.202(b). An indorsement written on a separate, but attached paper is called an
"allonge."
162. 737 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
163. Id. at 21. The earlier case of Estrada v. River Oaks Bank & Trust Co., 550 S.W.2d
719, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) had stated the require-
ment that an allonge is proper only if there is no more room on an instrument for
indorsements.
164. 737 S.W.2d at 22. Another part of the case is also of interest in connection with the
relationship between the law of commercial paper and the DTPA. The court further held that,
for purposes of this appeal only, a waiver of defenses clause was invalid as a waiver of rights
under § 17.42 of the DTPA. Id. at 20-21; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon
1987). The same argument might be raised against any instrument in negotiable form since it
carries with it the possibility of cutting off claims and defenses. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 3.302, .305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.206 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
165. Id. § 3.401(b).
166. Id. § 3.403.
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According to the court in Bradford v. McElroy 167 neither the principal nor
the agent is necessarily liable on the instrument! Although the court termed
the result an anomaly,1 6 8 the result follows from the application of section
3.403 as it relates to unnamed principals and actions between immediate
parties to an instrument. 169 The court remanded the case for a determina-
tion of the understanding of the parties when the instrument was issued. 1
70
In FD.LC. v. K-D Leasing Co. 7 1 the court held that the word "By" pre-
ceding a signature was sufficient to show a signing in a representative capac-
ity. 172 In a third signing case 173 the court held that the defendant had
waived the right to raise the issue of a signature made in a representative
capacity by allowing a default judgment to be entered against him when he
was sued on the note in question. 1 74 The failure to raise this matter as an
affirmative defense before the court entered a default precluded raising the
defense. 175
IV. BANK TRANSACTIONS
A. Stop Payment Orders
When Payment May Be Stopped. In two similar cases 176 different courts of
appeal reached diametrically opposite conclusions on the issue of whether an
"official check" and a "teller's check" issued by savings and loan associa-
tions are analogous to cashier's checks and whether payment may be
stopped on such instruments. The first opinion by the Dallas court involved
a scheme that left two Dallas men none the poorer after three hours of high
rolling and a Las Vegas casino holding an "official check" for $900,000 on
which payment had been stopped by the issuing savings and loan.' 77 The
second opinion involved a gasoline sales contract and a "teller's check" for
over $2,000,000 on which payment was stopped five days after the check was
issued. 178 Both courts referred to the seminal Texas case on the issuance
167. 746 S.W.2d 294, 296-97 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
168. Id. at 297-98.
169. The operative language is as follows: "An authorized representative who signs his
own name to an instrument . . . (2) except as otherwise established between the immediate
parties, is personally obligated if the instrument ... does not name the person represented but
does show that the representative signed in a representative capacity." TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 3.403(b)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (emphasis added).
170. 746 S.W.2d at 297-98.
171. 743 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ). This decision parallels the ex-
amples shown in the official comments to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.403 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968).
172. 743 S.W.2d at 776.
173. Simon v. BancTexas Quorum, 754 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
174. Id. at 285-86.
175. Id. at 286.
176. Guaranty Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 748 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1988, writ granted); University Say. Ass'n v. Intercontinental Consol. Co., 751
S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ granted). The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the assistance of Mr. Dwight Moody in preparing the description of these cases.
177. Guaranty Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 748 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1988, writ granted).
178. 751 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ granted).
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and acceptance of a cashier's check, Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank &
Trust,17 9 and both agreed that a bank may not stop payment on a cashier's
check. At that point, the courts diverged.
The Dallas court, finding no Texas cases on point, extensively reviewed
opinions from other states, particularly from New York and New Jersey,
and found two major approaches.1 80 The New York approach treats a bank
draft bought and paid for as an executed sale of credit not subject to rescis-
sion and countermand.' 8 ' The New Jersey approach turns on the fact that
the drawer and drawee are separate, as in both cases here, and permits the
drawer to issue a stop payment to the drawee.182 The Dallas court adopted
the New York approach based on findings that the issuing savings and loan
treated its "official check" as analogous to a cashier's check, repeatedly re-
ferred to it as a cashier's check and a bank money order in testimony, and
delivered it as the equivalent of cash.' 83 Consequently, the court held the
stop payment order was ineffective and the casino as holder was entitled to
recover from the drawer savings and loan.' 84 The court held the defense of
lack of consideration inapplicable against the casino. 1
85
The Houston court analogized the "teller's check," which is indistinguish-
able from the description in the case from an "official check," to a "bank
draft" drawn by a bank on an account it maintains in another bank or finan-
cial institution.' 8 6 The court specifically rejected the analogy to a cashier's
check since the savings and loan was the drawer, but not the drawee.' 87 The
court found support from a different set of New York cases than those cited
by the Dallas court and from a Georgia case very similar to the case before
the court.18 8 The court held that the savings and loan was not prohibited
from stopping payment on the teller's check and remanded the case for trial
on holder in due course and failure of consideration issues.' 8 9
Liability of Bank for Failure to Stop Payment. In Benjamin Franklin Savings
Association v. Kotrla 190 a husband and wife sought to stop payment on a
check they had written on their checking account. The stop order correctly
179. 495 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1973).
180. 748 S.W.2d at 524.
181. Id. at 524-25.
182. Id. at 525.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 529.
185. Id. Although the court assumed for purposes of its decision that the casino was not a
holder in due course, it nonetheless invoked the rule that a holder is entitled to recover on an
instrument upon its production unless the defendant establishes a defense. Id. at 526, 528. See
supra text accompanying note 158. The "official check" was issued in exchange for a check
that was later dishonored, and the court accepted the truth of the lack of consideration de-
fense, simply labeling the defense as "inapplicable." Id. at 529. Apparently a misunderstand-
ing of the Code sections 3.306 and 3.307 exists.
186. University Sav. Ass'n v. Intercontinental Consol. Co., 751 S.W.2d 657, 659-60 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ granted).
187. Id. at 659.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 751 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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described the check except for identifying it as Check # 398 instead of
Check # 399. At the same time, the customers transferred $7,800.00 from
their checking account into a money market account at the bank. The bank
entered the stop order in their stop payment log. Later that same day,
Check # 399 was presented for payment. Instead of stopping payment, the
bank changed the account number shown on the check, paid it out of the
money market account, and sent an insufficient funds notice to the custom-
ers stating that the check had been returned unpaid. The bank also debited a
$20.00 charge against the customers' account for the insufficient funds no-
tice. The customers discovered the check had been paid some three weeks
later when they received their bank statement. The customers sued for
breach of contract, negligence, and gross negligence on the part of the
bank. 19 1 The court of appeals upheld an award in the amount of $8,000.00
actual damages, representing the amount of the check, $28,000.00 in puni-
tive damages and $10,000.00 in attorney's fees. 192
B. Presentment of Instruments
Breach of Presentment Warranties. Upon presentment, each customer or
collecting bank warrants that it has good title to the instrument being
presented for payment. 193 While the warranty of good title certainly encom-
passes a warranty against forged indorsements, it can also include a war-
ranty against missing indorsements. The case of Longview Bank & Trust Co.
v. First National Bank 194 illustrates this point. In Longview only one of two
joint payees had indorsed a check and sent it through the collection process
for payment. After an extensive review of cases from other jurisdictions, as
well as secondary authorities, the court correctly held that a missing indorse-
ment was equivalent to a forged indorsement so far as a breach of warranty
on presentment is concerned. 195
V. LETTERS OF CREDIT
A. Form of Credit
Letter of Credit or Guaranty? One of the primary purposes of a letter of
credit is to separate the function of payment from the function of perform-
ance of the underlying transaction. An instrument that not only provides
for payment against documents but also requires that the beneficiary comply
with the terms of the underlying contract before payment constitutes a guar-
anty, rather than a true letter of credit.' 96 In Gunn-Olson-Stordahl Joint
191. Id. at 220.
192. Id. at 221-22. The court noted in the course of its opinion that the "acts of alteration
and payment constituted a breach of contract and negligence on the part of BFS [the bank]."
Id. at 222 (emphasis by court). See supra note 54 and accompanying text (concerning blending
of contract and tort liability under recent Texas law).
193. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.201(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
194. 750 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
195. Id. at 301.
196. Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1978).
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Venture v. Early Bank 197 the court held that a condition stated in a letter of
credit requiring factual performance of the underlying contract made the
purported credit a guaranty instead of a credit. 198
In contrast, a statement in a letter of credit specifying that payment will
be made against a document or statement certifying default in performance
or payment is an acceptable condition because it does not entangle the issuer
in the policing of the underlying transaction. 199 In Kerr Construction Co. v.
Plains National Bank 200 the court held that requiring a signed statement of
default by a contractor was proper to authorize the beneficiary to draw
under the credit. The court further held that an inconsistency in the date of
the letter of credit and a date stated in another paragraph in the credit
should be resolved by reference to ordinary rules of contract interpreta-
tion. 201 The court ruled that the date first stated in the credit controlled
over a later date that appeared in the last paragraph of the credit.202
B. Injunction Against Honor
Fraud in the Transaction. Fraud in the transaction provides one of the
three exceptions to the rule of absolute payment under a letter of credit.203
The usual type of fraud in the transaction that justifies an injunction against
honor is a breach of the underlying transaction that is so serious as to vitiate
the entire transaction. 204 In Alamo Savings Association v. Forward Construc-
tion Co.20 5 the claim of fraud went to the actions of the beneficiary who,
allegedly with the knowledge of the issuer, fraudulently induced a contractor
to obtain a letter of credit with the intent of using it as collateral for the
beneficiary's own loan from the issuer instead of using it to obtain a waiver
of the requirement of a payment and performance bond for the contractor.
The court affirmed the trial court's grant of a temporary injunction against
honor pending the outcome of trial20 6 and concluded that, if proven, this
fraud would be such as would vitiate the transaction. 20 7
C. Payment of Proceeds Under a Credit
Strict Compliance Required for Payment. In First Bank v. Paris Savings &
Loan Association 208 the court held that additional identifying language writ-
197. 748 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, writ denied).
198. Id. at 320.
199. Republic Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d at 115.
200. 753 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, writ denied).
201. Id. The court cited the leading case of Temple-Eastex Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672
S.W.2d 793, 798 (Tex. 1984) in support of this proposition.
202. 753 S.W.2d at 184.
203. The three exceptions are set out in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114(b) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968).
204. See, e.g., Phillipp Bros., Inc. v. Oil Country Specialists, 709 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ dism'd) (rejection rates ranging from 12 percent to 100 percent
on goods delivered under contract justified injunction against honor).
205. 746 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
206. Id. at 902.
207. Id. at 901.
208. 756 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
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ten on a draft drawn under a letter of credit was mere surplusage that did
not invalidate presentment under the credit. 20 9 The court further held that
the beneficiary was not required to include a statement describing modifica-
tions or renewals of the underlying indebtedness when no modifications or
renewals had occurred. 2 10
Proceeds as a Subject of Conversion. In Intermarkets USA. v. C-E Natco2 11
one company had assigned to another company the right to payment of pro-
ceeds under a letter of credit. The issuer paid the funds to the original bene-
ficiary, but the beneficiary never paid the funds over to the assignee. In an
action for conversion by the assignee to recover the funds, the court held the
proceeds paid under the letter of credit constituted a specified, identifiable
sum of money that the beneficiary had retained and converted for its own
use. 2 12 The court held the conversion action was proper and allowed the
assignee to recover. 213
VI. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Validity of Security Agreement
Relationship to Consumer Credit Code. In Gonzalez v. Gainan's Chevrolet
City21 4 the Texas Supreme Court held "there is no reason to presume the
legality of terms and provisions of a contract which are required or prohib-
ited by the Consumer Credit Code and which are not relevant to a finding of
usury. ' 21 5 This holding left in place the doctrine of "presumed legality" in
cases involving usury,21 6 but eliminated the doctrine in nonusury con-
texts. 2 17 In McCarty v. Citicorp Acceptance Co. 2 18 the court considered the
legality of a repossession clause that stated: "On any default, we will have
all the remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial
Code."' 2 19 While recognizing the application of Gainan to a clause of this
type, the court ruled that as a matter of law, the clause did not violate the
Consumer Credit Code. 220
209. Id. at 331.
210. Id. at 331-32.
211. 749 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
212. Id. at 604.
213. Id. at 606.
214. 690 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. 1985).
215. Id. at 887.
216. The doctrine of presumed legality permitted an ambiguous contract term to be con-
strued as complying with the law if the term was reasonably susceptible of such an interpreta-
tion. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Schuenemann, 668 S.W.2d 324, 332 (Tex. 1984).
217. Gainan's concerned the validity of a repossession clause providing that upon default
"seller or any sheriff or other officer of the law may take immediate possession of said [secured]
property without demand, including any equipment or accessories thereto; and for this purpose
seller may enter upon the premises where said property may be and remove same." 690 S.W.2d
at 888 (emphasis by court). The court held that, without applying the doctrine of presumed
legality, this clause could be read as authorizing a trespass in violation of the Consumer Credit
Code in TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989). Id. at 888-89.
218. 752 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
219. Id. at 207.
220. Id. at 207-08. The court also noted that TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-
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In Ballin v. Poston Home Care Center Co.221 the San Antonio court of
appeals considered a usury case under the doctrine of presumed legality.
222
The borrowers argued that the documents in question provided for accelera-
tion of the entire balance upon default, resulting in a usurious interest
charge. Based on a construction of all the documents executed as part of the
transaction, including several clauses that specifically excluded unearned in-
terest from the accelerated balance, the court held the contract was not
usurious.
2 2 3
Validity as Against Third Parties. In Modern Living, Inc. v. Niederhofer224
the seller of a mobile home ran into difficulties in repossessing the home after
the buyers defaulted because of the refusal of a mobile home park operator
to relinquish possession of the home while he was still owed money for past
due rents and utility charges. The parties negotiated from January to May,
and the secured creditor finally paid $900.00 to the park operator and ob-
tained possession of the home. The secured creditor then sued for interfer-
ence with the right to possession and for conversion of some of the contents
of the home. The trial court entered a take nothing judgment against the
creditor. 225 The court of appeals upheld the judgment on the conversion
action, but reversed and remanded on the action for interference with the
right to possession stating: "A commercial business should not be expected
to step to the line of forcible confrontation before they can claim intentional
interference with possession of chattels. 22
6
In Bruner v. Exxon Co., U.S.A. 227 the court considered the right of a party
holding an assignment of rentals under a lease to recover from the lessor and
7.07(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989) had been amended in 1979 to prohibit entry in violation of chap-
ter 9 of the Business and Commerce Code rather than prohibiting unlawful entry as under the
earlier version considered in Gainan's. 752 S.W.2d at 207. This change further clarifies the
notion that a clause of the type before the court did not authorize an unlawful remedy
although the same result should have obtained even under the earlier statutory language.
221. 749 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
222. Id. at 167.
223. Id. at 169. One of the clauses in the Retail Installment Contract executed by the
borrowers tracked the language suggested by the supreme court in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v.
Schuenemann, 668 S.W.2d 324, 332 (Tex. 1984). The Ballin court quoted the Schuenemann
court that stated: "[W]e fail to understand why acceleration clauses are drafted which do not
include a sentence expressly disavowing any intention to collect excessive unearned interest or
finance charges in the event the obligation is accelerated .. " 749 S.W.2d at 168 (quoting
Schuenemann, 668 S.W.2d at 333 n.6). The clause provided:
Secured Party (Seller) has no intent to contract for, receive or charge a time-
price differential in excess of that permitted under the laws of the State of Texas,
and in the event that any charge hereunder or under any instruments or docu-
ments associated herewith should result in a time-price differential in excess of
that permitted by law, any and all such excess shall not be payable by Buyer. ...
Id. at 166.
224. 751 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied).
225. Id. at 244.
226. Id. at 245-46. In a letter dated April 15, 1983, the park operator had stated "It will be
needless for you to send anyone to pick up a mobile home out of my park without the rent
being paid." Id. at 245.
227. 752 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
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lessee for an alleged wrongful cancellation of the lease. 228 The court held
that the lease could be terminated by the lessor and lessee without violating
the right of the assignee who was "merely an incidental beneficiary: a casual
assignee."'229 The court also noted that the assignee had drafted the assign-
ment and negotiated the lease and could have included terms in the docu-
ments to continue rental payments in the event of termination. 23 0 Although
this case did not arise under article 9, the resolution by the court is similar to
the result that would obtain under section 9.318 of the Code 23 1 and is seem-
ingly carried over into the proposed article 2A of the Uniform Commercial
Code on Leases of Personal Property.232
In a case233 concerning the assignment of rights under a security agree-
ment the court held that the assignee acquired the rights of the assignor
under the agreement, including any rights of subrogation resulting from pay-
ment of the secured debt by the assignor. 234 The assignee was entitled to
maintain an action to collect the secured debt that had been assigned. 23 5 In
MBank Grand Prairie v. State236 the court considered the rights of an un-
perfected secured creditor to obtain relief from forfeiture of a vehicle to the
state under the Controlled Substances Act.237 The court held that an un-
perfected security interest was a bona fide security interest notwithstanding
the lack of perfection and was protected against forfeiture under the terms of
the statute.238
B. Priorities
Priority Against Statutory Liens. In FDIC v. Sears, Roebuck & CO. 2 3 9 a pri-
ority conflict arose between a perfected security interest in inventory and a
statutory landlord's lien. The court stated:
[The landlord's lien statute] has been interpreted to provide a prefer-
ence lien to a landlord for rent that is due and for rent that is to become
due during the current twelve-month period succeeding the date of the
beginning of the lease or an anniversary of that date .... Each year of
the contract is viewed separately. At the beginning of each contract
year, if a UCC financing statement has been filed during the previous
228. Id. at 681.
229. Id. at 683.
230. Id. The assignee had received the assignment of part of the rents in consideration of
his services in arranging for the rental of the property.
231. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.318(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
232. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2A-303 (1987). The official comments to this sec-
tion make reference to § 9-318 and contemplate the continued operation of that section in the
context of lease transactions.
233. State Fidelity Mortgage Co. v. Varner, 740 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, writ denied).
234. Id. at 480-8 1. The assignor had pledged property as collateral for the debt of another
person and this property was used to pay part of the debt.
235. Id. at 481.
236. 737 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
237. The pertinent section of the act appears in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15,
§ 5.03(c) (Vernon 1976).
238. 737 S.W.2d at 427.
239. 743 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ).
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year, it then becomes superior to the landlord's lien. 240
Judgment was rendered in favor of the secured party.2
4
'
Loss of Purchase Money Protection. The Fourteenth District Court of Ap-
peals in Houston addressed the interesting question of when the twenty-day
time period for purchase money priority begins to run for purposes of the
special protection given to purchase money transactions under the Code. 2
42
The purchase money creditor had sold goods to a debtor on open account
for some time. During this time period, a bank loaned money to the same
debtor and took a non-purchase-money security interest in collateral then-
owned and thereafter acquired. When the seller became concerned about
the ability of the debtor to pay for the goods that were being delivered, a
security agreement was signed in favor of the seller and a financing state-
ment was filed within twenty days of the signing of this agreement, but well
after the bank had already filed a financing statement covering its non-
purchase-money interest.
The problem arose because the Code specifies that the twenty-day time
period begins to run when the debtor "receives possession of the collat-
eral."' 243 The seller argued that the goods did not become collateral until the
security agreement was signed; prior to that time, the debtor had only pos-
sessed "goods." The court correctly pointed out that this reading of the
Code seriously undermines the purpose of the filing system when property is
left in the possession of a debtor and there is nothing on record to show that
other parties have a claim to the property. 2 4 The court held that the seller
was not entitled to the special purchase money priority rule2 45 and that
under the first to file rule246 the seller occupied a second priority position. 2 4 7
Circular Priorities. One of the most difficult priority problems that can arise
under any statute containing a priority scheme is the conundrum of circular
priorities.248 A circular priority generally occurs in the form of "A has pri-
240. Id. at 773.
241. Id. at 774.
242. Mark Prods. U.S. v. Interfirst Bank Houston, 737 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied).
243. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
244. 737 S.W.2d at 392. This is one of the issues that may arise in consideration of the
proposed article 2A on Lease Transactions because that proposal does not require any notice
filing to show that property in the possession of a debtor is subject to a lease. The pros and
cons of required filing are discussed in Mooney, The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Owner-
ship" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39
ALA. L. REV. 683 (1988) and Kripke, Some Dissonant Notes About Article 2A, 39 ALA. L.
REV. 791 (1988).
245. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
246. Id. § 9.312(e).
247. 737 S.W.2d at 394.
248. Gilmore once wrote in regard to circular priority problems: "A judge who finds him-
self face to face with a circular priority system typically reacts in the manner of a bull who has
been goaded by the picadors: he paws the ground and roars with rage. The spectator can only
sympathize with judge and bull." G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY § 39.1, at 1020-21 (1965).
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ority over B, who has priority over C, who has priority over A."1249 In ITT
Diversified Credit Corp. v. First City Capital Corp.250 the Texas Supreme
Court considered a circular priority that arose because of a subordination
agreement between the holder of the first priority position and the holder of
the third priority position. 25' The court adopted the following formula to
resolve the circularity:
1. Set aside from the fund the amount of "A" 's claim.
2. Out of the money set aside, pay "C" the amount of its claim, pay
"A" to the extent of any balance remaining after "C" 's claim is
satisfied.
3. Pay "B" the amount of the fund remaining after "A" 's claim has
been set aside.
4. If any balance remains in the fund after "A" 's claim has been set
aside and "B" 's claim has been satisfied, distribute the balance to "C"
and "A". 2 52
C, Proceedings After Default
Burden of Proving Commercially Reasonable Disposition. The most active
single area of commercial law during the time period covered by this Article
concerned proceedings after default. 253 The rule requiring the secured party
to prove that a sale or other disposition of collateral was reasonable254 is
becoming increasingly well-established 25 5 although the Texas Supreme
Court has not provided a definitive opinion. 2 56
249. Id.
250. 737 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1987).
251. Id. at 804.
252. Id. (citing G. GILMORE, supra note 248, § 39.1, at 1021). This solution sometimes
referred to as the "New York Rule" apparently originated in Bacon v. Van Schoonhoven, 19
Hvn. 158 (1879), aff'd, 87 N.Y. 446 (1882).
253. The rights and remedies of parties following default are the subject of TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. chapter 9, subchapter E (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
254. The rule putting the burden of proving commercial reasonableness on the secured
party was first adopted in Texas by Sunjet, Inc. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 703 S.W.2d 285, 287
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
255. The Sunjet rule was applied in the following cases during the time period covered by
this article: Daniell v. Citizens Bank, 754 S.W.2d 407, 409-10 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1988, no writ) (better reasoned view puts burden of proving notice and commercially reason-
able disposition on secured party); Boles v. Texas Nat'l Bank, 750 S.W.2d 879, 880-81 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1988, no writ) (burden of pleading and proving a commercially reasonable dispo-
sition of collateral is on secured party); Whirlybirds Leasing Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter
Corp., 749 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ) (secured creditor has burden of
proving commercial reasonableness including proving that notice of intended disposition of
collateral was given); Hall v. Crocker Equip. Leasing, 737 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied) (burden of proving commercially reasonable resale and burden
of proving that repairs made to goods before resale were reasonable is on secured party); FDIC
v. Attayi, 745 S.W.2d 939, 948 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (proving notice
of sale is an element of secured party's case in action for a deficiency against a guarantor). But
see Folkes v. Del Rio Bank & Trust Co., 747 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988,
no writ) (failure to dispose of collateral in commercially reasonable manner is an affirmative
defense).
256. Although the supreme court has not directly spoken on the issue of burden of proof,
the court has held that the duty to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner
constitutes an implied covenant in all contracts under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504
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Right to Recover a Deficiency. The Texas Supreme Court in Tanenbaum v.
Economics Laboratory 25 7 adopted a rule denying the recovery of a deficiency
if the disposition of collateral was not conducted in a commercially reason-
able manner. 258 The peculiar facts in Tanenbaum left open questions about
the scope of the rule announced by the court.259 Recent cases have ad-
dressed some of these questions. The court in Adams v. Waldrop26° held
that the rule denying a deficiency extended to a guarantor and that a failure
to conduct a sale in a commercially reasonable manner discharged the liabil-
ity of the guarantor. 261 In Wright v. Interfirst Bank Tyler 2 62 a notice of
public sale of collateral did not constitute reasonable notification of the day,
place, and time of the private sale that ensued. 263 The failure to give proper
notice was held to bar recovery of a deficiency. 264 In Beltran v. Groos
Bank 265 the court held an oral notice of disposition of collateral sufficient to
satisfy the notice requirements of the Code. The court further concluded
that the creditor met the burden of proving that the disposition was com-
mercially reasonable. 266
Purchase of Collateral by Secured Party. Under the Code, a secured party
may purchase collateral after default only under very limited circum-
stances. 267 In Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Cunov 268 the secured party
purchased stock at a private sale following default. Because the stock was
not the subject of standard price quotations nor sold in a recognized market,
and because the sale was a private sale, the court held the secured party
liable to the debtor in an amount equal to the fair market value of the stock,
less the amount of the debt. 269 In another case270 involving the purchase of
collateral by a secured creditor, the court discussed the requirements of a
proper foreclosure and disposition of a vessel under the Ship Mortgage Act
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1989) and that breach of this covenant sounds in contract rather
than tort. International Bank v. Morales, 736 S.W.2d 662, 624 (Tex. 1987). Punitive damages
are not recoverable for breach of this covenant unless an independent tort is found. Id. This
raises the question, of course, of how the theory of negligent performance of contract fits into
the disposition of collateral under article 9.
257. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
258. Id. at 771-72.
259. Tanenbaum arose in the context of a retention of collateral instead of a sale, thereby
leaving open some issues about notice and the parties protected by the rule.
260. 740 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ).
261. Id. at 33.
262. 746 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
263. Id. at 877.
264. Id. at 878.
265. 755 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
266. Id. at 946-48.
267. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1989) allows a
secured party to purchase collateral only when it is of a type sold in a commonly recognized
market or is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations or if it is purchased at a
public sale. Id.
268. 749 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
269. Id. at 549.




of 1920.271 The court noted that ship foreclosures were excluded from the
coverage of the Code 272 and held that the trial court had correctly applied
the rule273 of Walter E. Heller & Co. v. O/S Sonny V.27 4 The rule requires
credit for the fair market value of a vessel to be credited against the debt
whenever a secured creditor bought the vessel at a foreclosure sale.275 The
court acknowledged that the creditor had met its burden of proving that the
foreclosure was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. 276 Texas
courts first addressed the issue of crediting fair market value of collateral
against debt in Lee v. Sabine Bank 277 where the court cited Walter E. Heller
as authority for a general rule applicable to all foreclosures, including fore-
closure under the maritime mortgage before the court.278 The issue arose
again during the time period covered by this article in Halter v. Allied
Merchants Bank.279 The Halter court, in dictum, noted the previous deci-
sion in Lee and suggested that it would follow that decision but for a failure
of the debtor to raise the issue on summary judgment that the bank or its
agent had purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. In contrast to Lee,
the Halter case involved real property. It seems only a matter of time until
Lee and Walter E. Heller float into the law of article 9.280
271. 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-984 (1975).
272. 744 S.W.2d at 305. The official comment to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.104
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1989) specifically mentions the Ship Mortgage Act as an example
of federal law that governs the rights of secured creditors outside of article 9.
273. 744 S.W.2d at 305.
274. 595 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1979).
275. Id.
276. 744 S.W.2d at 306.
277. 708 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
278. Id. at 584. In Lee the court ruled that a significant proven disparity between the
judicial sale price of the vessel and the appraisal value should give the debtor a deficiency offset
measured by the fair market value of the vessel as opposed to the foreclosure sale price when
the secured party is the successful bidder. In expansive dictum the court added:
We are persuaded that the rule [described above] is fair and reasonable and
should be applied in Texas law. But we know of no reason why it should be
restricted to ships, A lender who has secured collateral, whether personalty or
realty is under a trust arrangement with the borrower, in the event of foreclo-
sure, to make an honest effort to reduce the loan as much as possible by securing
a fair price for the collateral.
Id.
279. 751 S.W.2d 286, 287-88 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
280. The possible expansion of Lee v. Sabine Bank, 780 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), will no doubt meet with resistance as evidenced by the decision in
Huddleston v. Texas Commerce Bank, 756 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ
denied), where the court refused to extend the article 9 rules on personal property foreclosures
to real property foreclosures and require the lender to prove that it had disposed of the real
property in a commercially reasonable manner.
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